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Modern law of the sea developments has raised questions relating to the application
of treaty-based, non-formalised and non-treaty based regulations of cooperation, as
well as norms of international customary law and State practice, which have been
introduced after the 1921 Convention relating to the Non-fortification of and
Neutralisation of the Åland Islands.1 The Åland Islands are unique within Europe,
and their legal status cannot be compared to anywhere else in the region. The Åland
archipelago is located within the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, between Finland
and Sweden. As a result of the geographical connection to the Finnish mainland, the
demilitarised and neutralised sea area of the Åland Islands is located within the
territorial sea and internal waters of Finland. The Åland Strait, a narrow stretch of
water connecting the Gulf of Bothnia with the Baltic Sea between the Åland Islands
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and Sweden is a particularly important sea route.2 In terms of the law of the sea, the
development of weapon technology has made warships more effective and
enhanced their roles in warfare. Coastal States have also become more alert to the
threat of nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear weapons. Furthermore,
in the twenty-first century, the number of unlawful activities at sea has become a
challenge to maritime trade. Today, the most significant of the unlawful activities is
terrorism, and as a result there has been an increase in the interest shown in
maritime security by the international community. Traditionally, weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) have been in the hands of States. Recently, it has become
possible for non-State actors to acquire WMD and related materials, and this has
increased the probability of unlawful trafficking of WMD across the world. The
demilitarised sea around the Åland Islands is at risk of this unlawful behaviour.
The Proliferation Security Initiative came about following the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001 and after the So San incident.3 The Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) is a cooperation arrangement that aims to prevent the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. It was
introduced by the United States as a measure to prevent terrorist attacks in 2003,
and the principle has been endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolutions
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,4 as well as by the adoption of the
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation.5 The 2005 SUA Protocol was the first treaty that
recognised the trafficking of WMD and related materials as illegal behaviour.6 As a
2According to HELCOM publication Shipping Accidents in the Baltic Sea in 2013 14,433 ships on
the Åland West route and 1397 ships on the Åland East route have crossed AIS fixed lines through
the Åland Strait during the year 2013, HELCOM (2014), pp. 3–7.
3The missiles of North Korean origin were in transit to Yemen by a ship flying under Cambodian
flag. The So San was intercepted and boarded by the Spanish Navy relying on U.S. intelligence and
subsequently released due to lack of legal support for the seizure. See more Byers (2004),
pp. 526–527.
4UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011), 2055
(2012).
5Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms on the Continental Shelf adopted on 1 November 2005 and entered into force on
28 July 2010 (‘2005 SUA Protocol’).
6Durkalec (2012), p. 14, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, at https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Protocol_2005_
Convention_Maritime_navigation.pdf. The Achille Lauro incident of 1985 gave rise to the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf
(the SUA Convention and SUA Protocol), adopted 10 March 1988 and entered into force 1 March
1992, as a measure to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and security of
passengers and crew. IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, March 13, 1988, entered into force on March 1, 1992,
IMO Doc SUA/CONF/15, ILM 27 (1988), pp. 672–684.
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non-treaty-based partnership of States, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is
aimed to complement existing international arms control arrangements such as the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),7 the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC)8 and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).9
The aim of the PSI participants was to stop the illicit transport ofWMDon the oceans.
The major problem as regards illicit trafficking is not the ready-made WMD but is
more often the trafficking of components, technologies and production materials
related to WMD. The problem with these items is that majority of them can have
civilian as well as military end uses. Such dual-use materials pose a problem because
they are mostly used for peaceful purposes, and in these circumstances their transpor-
tation is legal. The main concern of the PSI is to prevent States and non-State actors of
proliferation concern from acquiring the materials to build WMD.10
Although the PSI is a political initiative, after the adoption of the Statement of
Interdiction Principles that sets forth the objectives and working methods of the
PSI, it has implications for the existing law of the sea.11 The Statement of Inter-
diction Principles says that PSI activities will not violate international law. How-
ever, subparagraph 4 (d) (1) of the Statement of Interdiction Principles calls on
participants to take appropriate actions to stop and/or search in their territorial seas
vessels that are ‘reasonably suspected’ of carrying such cargoes to or from States or
non-State actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are
identified.
The requirement in subparagraph 4 (d) (1) is problematic because although
coastal States have sovereignty over their territorial seas, it is limited by Article
19 of UNCLOS, which regulates the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels.
However, today 105 States are participants to the PSI, and when they act unilater-
ally they give rise to new State practice. If several flag States were to accept
boarding by a coastal State of a ship exercising the right of innocent passage
because the ship was suspected of the illegal trafficking of WMD without prior
7Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted on 1 July 1968 and entered into
force on 5 March 1970 at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/
1970/infcirc140.pdf.
8Chemical Weapons Convention, adopted on 13 January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April
1997 at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc/text.
9Biological Weapons Convention, adopted on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March
1975 at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc/text.
10US Department of State Proliferation Security Initiative at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.
htm, Logan (2005), p. 255, Prosser and Scoville (2004), Beck (2004), p. 16 at http://www.uga.edu/
cits/documents/pdf/monitor/monitor_sp_2004.pdf.
“The PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery
systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks,
including the UN Security Council.” Fact Sheet The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary (2003).
11Winner (2005), p. 130.
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permission of the flag State, it would weaken the existing legal norm relating to
right of innocent passage that has its roots far back in history. This is especially true
because the PSI is targeted to merchant ships, and the origin of the concept is
freedom of navigation of merchant ships over the oceans.12 Thus, at least in theory,
the new State practice of the provision regulating innocent passage would narrow
the scope of the right of innocent passage.
Although the sovereignty of coastal States extends to the territorial seas, such
sovereignty includes some restrictions that do not exist for a State’s land-based
territory or its internal waters. On the territorial sea, all foreign ships enjoy the right
of innocent passage, an old principle concept of the law of the sea, today codified in
the UN Law of the Sea Convention. As long as the passage is innocent, the coastal
State has restricted jurisdiction to interfere with the passage. It seems that the PSI’s
main output—the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP)—includes elements
that contradict with UNCLOS.
This chapter discusses the relationship of the PSI and the resolutions of the UN
Security Council, whose aim is to stop the illicit transport of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) on the oceans, to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and to the 1921 Åland Convention. Today, all parties to the 1921 Åland
Convention, as well as Russia, are participants in the PSI, and they are also parties
to the UNCLOS and member States of the United Nations.
2 The Demilitarisation of the Åland Islands
The Åland Islands’ international legal regime was confirmed in the aftermath of the
First World War. The Åland Islands and its surrounding sea area was demilitarised
and neutralised by the 1921 Åland Convention. In 1921, the Åland Convention
stated that it is complementary to the 1856 Convention between France, Great
Britain and Russia, which resulted in the demilitarisation of the Åland Islands after
the Crimean War. The 1921 Åland Convention has since been supplemented by the
1940 Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union. Following the Second World
War, the 1947 Peace Treaty confirmed the status quo by declaring that ‘the Åland
Islands will remain demilitarised according to the present situation’ Furthermore,
the position of the Åland Islands was also mentioned in the EU Treaty of Accession
when Finland joined the EU in 1995.13
12Thomas (2009), p. 657.
13Convention relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands, Finnish
Treaty Series 1/1922, English translation available in 17 AJIL 1923, Supplement: Official Doc-
uments, pp. 1–6. Hereinafter the 1921 Åland Convention, Treaty concerning the Åland Islands
between Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Finnish Treaty Series 24/1940. By
the Armistice Agreement 19.10.1944, the bilateral treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union
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The location of the Åland Islands indicates that they may be of military strategic
significance. A military power in control of Åland and with aggressive intentions
could use the islands as a base for military operations. Sweden has always been the
most active proponent of the demilitarised and neutralised status of the Åland
Islands because any power controlling the Åland Islands would be able to threaten
Sweden’ s east coast and the capital city of Stockholm. In addition, the former
Soviet Union was in favour of the demilitarisation of the Åland Islands, and a
bilateral treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was concluded on the
initiative of the Soviet Union to this effect.14
Security has been the most important question in negotiations concerning the
area of the Åland Islands. When Russia conquered Finland during the 1808–1809
war, the strategic situation changed in the Baltic Sea region. According to the 1809
Peace Treaty, the Tornea˚ and Muonio rivers and the Gulf of Bothnia combined to
form the Russia–Sweden border, and the Åland Islands belonged to Russia.15 This
situation was worrying from a Swedish perspective because the Åland Islands were
a strategic stronghold. In this sense, the situation became a serious security issue for
Sweden as the Åland Islands becoming a part of Russia created new localised
threats. It is easy to understand therefore that the peace negotiations following the
1808–1809 war and any other matters regarding the Åland Islands were of vital
importance to Sweden. During peace negotiations, Sweden’s primary goal was to
retain the Åland Islands, but efforts to secure this objective failed. A second option
for Sweden was the non-fortification of the islands, but this proposal was also
rejected.
This notion of the non-fortification of the Åland Islands emerged again during
peace negotiations following the Crimean War. Sweden had remained neutral
during the war and had not taken part in the negotiations. However, Sweden used
its diplomatic influence to convince Britain and France to voice concerns on its
behalf. Sweden was thus presented with a new opportunity to regain the Åland
Islands. If successful, the Åland Islands would belong to Sweden and the special
demilitarised status of the islands would no longer be necessary. Efforts made to
accomplish this, however, did not bear fruit, and instead in an effort to reach a
compromise, the Åland Islands were demilitarised.
concerning the demilitarisation of the Åland Islands was re-confirmed. This meant that fortifica-
tions on the Åland Islands had to be destroyed, Reactivation of the Treaty concerning the Åland
Islands between Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Finnish Treaty Series
9/1948, Peace Treaty with Finland, Finnish Treaty Series 20/1947: English translation available
in 42 AJIL 1948, Supplement: Official Documents, pp. 203–223, Commission opinion on
Finland’s application for membership on 4th November 1992. The 1940 Treaty was confirmed
by the 1992 Protocol between Finland and the Russian Federation.
14Hannikainen (1994), p. 615.
15The Treaty of Fredrikshamn. www.histdoc.net/history/fr/frhamn.html. Accessed 19 Jan 2016.
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The 1856 Convention is short and only covers demilitarisation. There is no clear
definition in the Convention regarding the territory to which it applies. However,
Article I of the Convention refers to the islands of Åland and has therefore only
been applied to this specific land area. Thus, it was possible to carry out military
operations in the seas surrounding the Åland Islands without infringing on the
principle of demilitarisation. The 1856 Convention is also silent regarding defence
arrangements permitted during times of war. During the First World War, the
demilitarisation of the Åland Islands was not respected. Russia fortified the Åland
Islands and used them as a base for military operations against Germany. In the late
stages of the war in 1918, the Åland Islands were first occupied by Sweden and then
by Germany. The fortifications were demolished in 1919 by Finland, which had
emerged as a new independent State.16 In the aftermath of the First World War, the
Åland Islands became an object of a territorial dispute between Finland and
Sweden.17 The League of Nations settled the dispute, and the sovereignty of the
Åland Islands was recognised as belonging to Finland. As a result of this settlement,
the Åland Islands and their surrounding sea area were demilitarised and neutralised
by the 1921 Åland Convention.
A huge threat to the demilitarised and neutralised status of the Åland Islands was
posed by the outbreak of the Second World War as the Åland Islands were a key
strategic focal point for belligerents. During the war, the legal status of the Åland
Islands was respected, although both Germany and the Soviet Union had plans to
occupy the islands. Finland, however, decided to fortify the islands. When Finland
informed the parties to the 1921 Åland Convention of its military preparations, they
did not express any criticism.18 Since the end of the Second World War, the Åland
Islands have been spared from any further military operations.
The 1921 Åland Convention offers certain exceptions when considering a
military presence within the zone during peacetime and when there is armed
conflict, and the exceptions are different depending on whether the vessel is Finnish
or not. Furthermore, the passage accorded to ships can be divided into two parts:
namely, when passing through territorial seas and when entering internal waters.
The 1921 Åland Convention limits Finnish warships and aircraft, as well as
Finland’s authority to regulate any access granted to foreign warships, either
when entering or staying within the zone. But the Åland Convention also refers
to the rules of international law and practice, in the event of the innocent passage of
warships. When the Åland Convention was concluded, the international law of the
sea was based on customary law, which left coastal States wide discretionary
powers to determine the nature of passage. At present, the international law of
the sea consists of rules that are applied from treaty law and customary international
16Hannikainen (1994), p. 617.
17O’Brien (2012).
18Hannikainen (1994), p. 618.
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law. Although the conventions relating to the right of innocent passage sought to
codify the customary law, the very act of codification reduces a State’s discretion.
The preamble to the 1921 Åland Convention says that the Convention has been
made in order to guarantee peace and stability, in the sense that the Åland Islands
shall never become a threat from a military perspective. The phrasing of the
preamble to the Convention clearly shows that there was a common interest
among States to secure the region, with a particular focus on the Åland Islands. It
is understandable that the legal scope of the Convention was expanded to cover the
islands’ surrounding sea areas so as to prevent military activities from occurring in
the future. It may also be said the geographical range of the 1921 Åland Convention
is connected to various security issues and the ability of States to handle these issues
within the limits of the region. The demilitarised and neutralised zone therefore
exists as a consequence of localised security threats that were identified by parties
to the 1921 Convention.
The 1921 Åland Convention established Åland’s three-nautical- mile territorial
sea, thereby separating the demilitarised and neutralised sea areas from other parts
of Finland’s territorial sea. A coastal State has sovereignty over its territorial sea.
The right of innocent passage is the main restriction imposed by international law
over any coastal State wishing to exercise sovereignty over its territorial sea.
Taking the sea within the Convention, it also introduced rules of the international
law of the sea to the content of the Convention. Although Article 4 prohibits all
kinds of military presence in the area, there are some exceptions to this provision.
These exceptions relate to Finland and its right to regulate navigation and the
presence of foreign vessels in its territorial waters, which are at the same time
also a demilitarised and neutralised area. During the negotiation process of the
Convention, States also had to solve the question of the right of innocent passage
through the demilitarised and neutralised zone.
Article 5 of the 1921 Åland Convention grants warships the right of innocent
passage through areas of the Åland Islands’ territorial waters that are part of the
neutralised zone. However, the article makes references to international rules and
usages in force that therefore sets limits to the application. The Article indicates that
Finland’s authority to enact rules that would prohibit the innocent passage of
warships through the territorial waters of the Åland Islands is restricted. The Article
is also applicable to Finnish warships, and as a result the 1921 Åland Convention
restricts a coastal State’s jurisdiction over its own territorial sea. The possibility of
prohibiting innocent passage was never properly addressed during the 1921 Con-
ference discussions, and only Finland had expressed its view on the matter by
stating its right to prohibit innocent passage in special circumstances.19
19“. . . le droit d’interdire le passage inoffensive dans des circonstances spe´ciales” in Actes de la
Confe´rence, p. 64.
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3 An Overview of the Proliferation Security Initiative
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) arose out of the 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks and after the So San incident. The So San incident showed that
the United States had no legal authority to seize the missiles of North Korean origin
that were in transit to Yemen by a ship flying under the Cambodian flag. The United
States lacked a clear legal authority to seize the missiles, but there was also no
provision under international law prohibiting Yemen accepting the delivery of the
missiles from North Korea.20 The PSI was originally proposed by the United States
in 2003 in Krakow, Poland, by President Bush, who stated that the ‘greatest threat to
peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons’ and announced
the PSI.
‘When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must
have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to
fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and
a number of our close allies, including Poland, have begun working on new
agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal
weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this partnership as
broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive weapons away from our
shores and out of the hands of our common enemies.’21
The PSI is not a treaty but is rather a statement of intention to prevent the
movement of weapons of mass destruction and related materials at ports and
different maritime zones without maintaining any organisational frameworks.22
The PSI aims to complement existing international arms control arrangements. It
refers to the rules of international law but not specifically to the norms of the law of
the sea.23 The PSI represents new forms of international cooperation beyond
international treaties and organisations.
Initially this United-States-led initiative co-opted 10 States (Poland, Australia,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom). These 11 original participants are the core group of the PSI. They
adopted the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which was announced on
20Ahlstr€om (2005), p. 741, Logan (2005), p. 253, see also Garvey (2005), pp. 128–129.
21Remarks by the President to the People of Poland (2003) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html.
22In the Proliferation Security Initiative meeting in London 9–10 October 2003 the participants to
the meeting agreed that “the PSI was a global initiative with an inclusive mission. Successful
interdiction of trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems and related materials requires the widest
possible co-operation between states. Participation in the PSI, which is an activity not an
organisation, should be open to any state or international body that accepts the Paris Statement
of Principles and makes an effective contribution.” at http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/
security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/psi/Pages/proliferation-security-initiative-
london-9-10-october-2003-2.aspx. Klein (2011), p. 150, Jinyuan (2012), p. 97.
23See Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland http://formin.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid¼
325890&contentlan¼2&culture¼en-US.
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4 September 2003 in Paris and which is a significant public output of the initia-
tive.24 The interdiction principles identify concrete actions to collectively or indi-
vidually interdict shipments of WMDs, their delivery systems and related
materials.25 However, the Statement of Interdiction Principles does not bind par-
ticipants to the PSI legally; it is a political commitment and practical cooperation to
help impede and stop the flow of WMDs, their delivery systems and related
materials to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern. The
Interdiction Principles set forth the objectives and working methods of the PSI.26
The PSI cooperation is operated by exercises and bilateral ship-boarding agree-
ments. The aim of the PSI partnership is to establish a network that impedes and
stops the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related materials, as well as their delivery
systems.27 Today, 105 States have publicly endorsed the PSI, and the European
Union has given its support to the cooperation.28 Finland has been a participant in
the PSI since 2004. Although the PSI has no permanent institutional structure, it has
an Operational Experts Group, which comprises 21 States (Australia, Argentina,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States). The group meets frequently,
and its task is to take care of the planning for the initiative to ensure the PSI’s
effectiveness by contributing customs, law enforcement, military and other security
experts and assets to interdiction exercises, hosting PSI meetings, workshop and
exercises with other PSI-endorsing States.29 Through the PSI partnership, States
have established a network that impedes and stops the illicit trafficking of WMDs
and related material, as well as their delivery systems.30
It is clear that the international community has a negative attitude towards the
proliferation of WMDs. Evidence of this is found in the number of participants in
the treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC). However, there are number of States that are not party to the NPT
Convention, e.g. North Korea. Although these conventions prohibit the prolifera-
tion, transport and sale of biological and chemical weapons, they do not grant high
24Ahlstr€om (2005), p. 745.
25Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman’s Statement at the Third Meeting (2003).
26Ahlstr€om (2005), p. 745, Winner (2005), p. 130.
27http://www.psi-online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/01-about-psi/0-about-us.html, Tornberg (2009),
p. 140.
28China, India and Pakistan are not participants of the PSI.
29See Operational Experts Group at http://www.psi-online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/04-Operational-
Experts-Group/0-operational-experts-group.html (4.2.2016). China is not a participant of the PSI,
but it has a joint declaration with the European Union Joint declaration of the People’s Republic of
China and the European Union on Non-proliferation and Arms Control, C/04/348, Brussels,
8 December 2004, 15854/04 (Presse 348).
30http://www.psi-online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/01-about-psi/0-about-us.html, Tornberg (2009), p. 140.
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seas interdictions, even inter partes. As the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons Case recognises, these conventions are not sufficient evidence of State
practice or opinio juris to create a legal obligation or to prohibit the use of certain
weapons of mass destruction.31 The PSI was intended to establish a last means for
stopping the transfers of WMDs and related materials, in case the proliferators had
managed to load such material aboard a ship. The geographical scope of the
initiative focused on the high seas because ships on the high seas are subject to
the authority of the State whose flag they fly.32
The major problem regarding illicit trafficking is not the ready-made WMDs but
components, technologies, production materials and means of delivery associated
with WMDs. The problem with these items is that the majority of them are civilian
as well as military end uses. The dual-use materials pose a problem because they are
mostly used for peaceful purposes, and their trade is legal. The proliferation
problem caused by dual-use materials is significant because 95 of the elements
for WMDs are dual use. Added to this is the problem that globalisation and
technological advancement and the dissemination and accessibility of knowledge
and technology necessary to acquire WMD capabilities have increased exponen-
tially since the 1990s. This development has not only increased the ability of States
to obtain WMDs but has also enabled non-State actors to obtain them. Thereby, the
main concern of the PSI is to prevent States and non-State actors of proliferation
concern from acquiring the materials to build WMDs.33 However, States have to
bear in mind that especially in the case of nuclear materials, the legal transfer of
nuclear materials is also an issue. Regarding the right of innocent passage, Article
23 of UNCLOS establishes requirements34 for the trafficking of foreign nuclear-
powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious
substances. Thus, government transportation is out of the scope of the PSI. It
applies only to commercial transportation. Consequently, any unlawful activities
undertaken by warships in the exercise of their official duties will be governed by
rules of international law.35 According to UNCLOS, warships are required to
comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea. If a foreign warship disregards a request for compliance
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.36
31Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I. C.
J. Reports 1996, pp. 66, 226.
32Durkalec (2012), p. 2, Ahlstr€om (2005), p. 744, Byers (2004), p. 527.
33http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm, Fidler (2003), Prosser and Scoville (2004), Beck (2004),
p. 16, Logan (2005), p. 255, Jimenez Kwast (2007), pp. 164–167.
34Article 23 requires that foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other
inherently dangerous or noxious substances provide certain documents upon request and observe
special precautionary measures established for them according to international agreements when
they exercise their right of innocent passage.
35Lehto (2008), p. 57.
36UNCLOS art. 30.
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Over 90% of international trade is transported by sea; therefore, the marine
transport of WMDs and related materials is the core concern of the PSI. Today,
maritime shipping is fast and cost-effective, owing to the use of standardised
containers that can be directly transferred to and from ground networks at the
ports. The effectiveness of the transportation system in ordinary commercial ship-
ping increases the possibility that WMD-related materials are trafficked undetected.
At sea, the boarding and inspection of big containerships requires well-resourced
and trained forces and is still difficult and dangerous. Furthermore, any kind of
delay in shipping results in increased costs.37 Taking into consideration that the
illicit shipment of WMD-related materials is not frequent, the costs of the imple-
mentation of the PSI by stopping and searching numerous ships that are not causing
any threat would be unreasonable for commercial shipping.38
The PSI is an effort to cover the weaknesses of the international
non-proliferation regime, and that is also the purpose of Security Council Resolu-
tion 1540 (2004) adopted under Chapter VII UN Charter. The resolution endeav-
ours to fill gaps in international non-proliferation efforts by obliging States to
refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to
develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their means of delivery and encourages States to take
effective measures to conform their relevant obligations and responsibilities.39
However, the resolution does not authorise interdiction. Regarding criminal juris-
diction, the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related materials is not classified as
universal crime, and thus it is not subject to universal jurisdiction.
The PSI participants’ readiness to conduct interdiction operations is developed
by exercises. These exercises have made it possible for different authorities of the
participants in the PSI such as armed forces, customs, police and intelligence to
meet and create connections with each other. Today, the PSI is increasingly focused
on commercial trade in dual-use materials, which has also made the exercises more
civilian oriented. Although the exercises involve more civilian law enforcement
authorities, most of the exercises still have a strong military aspect.40
3.1 Scope of the UNSC Resolutions
The Security Council has linked the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biolog-
ical weapons, as well as their means of delivery, with the notion of a threat to
37Jimenez Kwast (2007), p. 167 see also fn. 24, Kraska (2009), p. 123.
38Logan (2005), p. 259.
39UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), Jimenez Kwast (2007), p. 169, see also Resolu-
tions 1673 (2006), 1805 (2008) and 1977(2011), extending the mandate of the Committee to April
25 2021.
40Durkalec (2012), pp. 15–16.
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international peace and security with Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 adopted
under Chapter VII of the Charter and the others that followed it. The resolutions
also define the means of delivery to cover missiles, rockets and other unmanned
systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons that are
specially designed for such use.41
The resolutions state that the proliferation of WMDs, as well as their means of
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security and oblige States to
refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to
develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use WMDs and
related materials and to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws that prohibit
any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or
use these materials. Furthermore, the resolution required States to take and enforce
effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation,
including (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law
enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls.42 Security
Council Resolution 1540 as well as further resolutions do not specifically authorise
the non-flag States to board ships and to seize WMD-related cargo or provide any
other enforcement authority.43 Interdiction was not included in the resolution
because of China’s opposition to the matter, and thus the resolution only refers to
international cooperation to prevent illicit trafficking.44
The main rule in international law of the sea recognises the exclusive jurisdiction
of a flag State on the high seas. Some provisions of UNCLOS are exceptions to this
main rule. The exceptions are related universal crimes occurring on the high seas.
Today, State practice and treaties after over a decade of adoption of the PSI and
UNSC Resolutions have not amended the flag State’s exclusive jurisdiction over its
ships, although the popularity of the PSI might indicate that there has emerged a
norm of customary international law against proliferation allowing States to take
certain actions to prevent it.45 However, during the negotiations for the resolution
on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a representative of the United
Kingdom stated that the resolution does not ‘authorize enforcement action against
States or against non-State actors in the territory of another country. The draft
resolution makes clear that it will be the Council that will monitor its implemen-
tation. Any enforcement action would require a new Council decision.’ The repre-
sentative of the United States also stated that the resolution is ‘not about
enforcement’.46
41UN Security Council Resolutions 1540(2004), 1810(2008), 1977(2011).
42UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), Durkalec (2012), p. 13.
43Rayfuse (2005), p. 198, Logan (2005), p. 270, Durkalec (2012), p. 13.
44Winner (2005), p. 136.
45Logan (2005), p. 271.
46UN Security Council meeting of April 22 S/PV.4950 (2004), p. 12, 17. The Council has adopted
enforcement actions against Iran (Resolution 1929 (2010)) and North Korea (Resolution 1874
(2009)). These Resolutions ‘call on all states to inspect all cargo to and from Iran and North Korea
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UN Security Council Resolutions are a step towards a universal global
non-proliferation regime. Today, they supplement existing non-proliferation and
disarmament laws and regulations, but the resolutions do not grant any new
authority or jurisdiction to States.47
4 Legal Problems with the PSI and the Right of Innocent
Passage
Security Council Resolutions, the 2005 SUA Protocol being the first international
convention recognising the trafficking of WMDs and related materials as illegal,
and the right of self-defence do not provide any enforcement power, or if they do,
the power is limited in certain circumstances on the high seas where a flag State has
exclusive jurisdiction over the ship and crew.48 Thus, the use of national military
and law enforcement power is regulated by the rules of the law of the sea. Even
though the freedom of navigation, one of the oldest principles of the customary
international law, is limited in certain circumstances, even on the high seas, where a
warship has a right to board vessels, regarding the illicit trafficking of WMDs and
related materials, the problem is that the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related
materials is not universally condemned in the same terms in the law of the sea as the
slave trade.49 On the territorial seas, the principle of freedom of navigation is
exercised through the concept of the right of innocent passage. Regarding the illicit
trafficking of WMDs and related materials, it would be wrong if the right of ships to
exercise freedom of navigation on the high seas were to be more limited than the
right to innocent passage within a coastal State’s territorial waters.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea authorises the boarding of
a foreign ship on the high seas in cases of piracy, slave trade, unauthorised
broadcasting or when a ship is stateless.50 Foreign warships or coast guard author-
ities may interdict and search a ship only in the aforementioned cases. A coastal
State has power under international law to stop and seize cargo on its internal waters
and territorial sea, except when a foreign ship is exercising the right of innocent
passage. The 2005 SUA Protocol criminalised and created new enforcement pro-
cedures to prevent maritime terrorism and the use of ships by terrorists and for
that is in their territory, including seaports and airports, if there are “reasonable grounds” to believe
the cargo contains items of which the supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited. Both resolutions
also call on states to cooperate in inspections and, more significantly, they authorize all UN
members to seize and dispose of prohibited cargo’. Durkalec (2012), p. 13. The Resolution 1929
(2010) was terminated by the Resolution 2231(2015) see http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/.
47Allen (2007), p. 59.
48Jinyuan (2012), p. 98, Dixon (2006), p. 23, Durkalec (2012), p. 14.
49Cirincione and Williams (2005).
50UNCLOS art. 110.
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terrorist purposes. Article 8bis created a new procedure for boarding a ship on the
high seas, which is suspected of being involved in offences under the SUA
Convention.51 However, the Convention does not contain any change for the flag
State’s exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas; thus, a State party to the Convention
has to ask the flag State’s authorisation to board and to take appropriate measures.
The UN Law of the Sea Convention does not directly speak about security
issues; although some provisions regulate warships, they do not deal with naval
warfare, disarmament, demilitarisation or denuclearisation. The lack of discussions
of military operations in the UN Law of the Sea Conference was not accidental;
they were deliberately left out of the discussions.52 The Convention refers to
security in the context of the right of innocent passage.53 The indirect references
to the security issues indicate that the Convention’s intention is to regulate the uses
of the seas in times of peace. A coastal State may temporarily suspend the right of
innocent passage if it deems such suspension essential for the protection of its
security (Article 25(3)). Article 21 grants a coastal State the possibility to regulate
the passage of ships exercising their right of innocent passage; however, those laws
and regulations may focus on the safety of navigation and protection of the marine
environment, not security matters.
5 Interdictions by Participants in Their Territorial Sea
5.1 Sovereignty and Jurisdiction of Coastal States
Aside from territorial sea claims, States are primarily concerned about the rights of
access and resource exploitation within their territorial waters. The most important
topics concerning legislative jurisdiction have been navigation, customs, fishing,
sanitation and security. Oceans have always served as the most convenient highway
for launching attacks, and because of this, coastal State security interests are
grounded by a crucial understanding that territorial seas provide important routes
to follow when reaching shores. Coastal State claims to authority over territorial sea
areas are commonly described as an assertion of sovereignty over a part of coastal
State’s land territory.54
Sovereignty includes territorial sea claims made by States as they seek to control
access to their waters. In aiming to secure comprehensive and continuous authority
to deny passage through their territorial seas, the focus of coastal States has mainly
centred upon the concept of innocent passage. Moreover, States have sought a
51Bergin (2005), pp. 89–90.
52O’Connell (1984), p. 825, Hakapa¨a¨ (1988), pp. 69–70, Vukas (2004), pp. 4–5, Rayfuse
(2005), p. 189.
53UNCLOS art. 19.
54McDougal and Burke (1987), p. 179.
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number of claims that have included occasional exclusive competence to deny
passage in regard to specific cases, a right to prescribe policy for territorial sea
cases, a right to prescribe and apply policies to solve problems aboard vessels and a
right to the exclusive appropriation of resources.55
Sovereignty over territorial sea areas grants coastal States the following rights:
– Coastal States have an exclusive right to fish and to exploit the resources of the
seabed and subsoil.
– They have exclusive enjoyment of the air space above the territorial sea area as
foreign aircraft does not enjoy the same rights of innocent passage as foreign
vessels do.
– A coastal State has an exclusive right to transport goods and passengers from one
part of its territory to another part.
– During times of war when a coastal State is neutral, belligerent States are not
allowed to engage in combat, or capture merchant vessels, within the coastal
State’s territorial sea.
– Foreign vessels must obey regulations concerning navigation, health, customs
duties and immigration that are enacted by a coastal State.56
In addition to these rights, a coastal State has both civil and criminal jurisdiction
over merchant vessels exercising the right of innocent passage, as well as persons
on board such vessels.57 Regarding warships, however, a coastal State does not
have this kind of jurisdiction and may only demand that the warship leave its
territorial sea if it does not comply with persistent requests to adhere to coastal
State regulations.58
The Statement of Interdiction Principles says that the PSI activities will not
violate international law. However, subparagraph 4 (d) of the Statement of Inter-
diction Principles calls participants to take appropriate actions to do the following:
(1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas or contiguous zones
(when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes
to or from States or non-State actors of proliferation concern and to seize such
cargoes that are identified; and
(2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters
or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such
as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search and seizure of such
cargoes prior to entry.
55McDougal and Burke (1987), p. 179.
56UNCLOS arts. 2, 19, 21, Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
in Naval War, adopted on 18 October 1907 and entered into force on 26 January 1910 art.
1, Malanczuk (1997), pp. 177–178.
57TSC arts. 19, 20, UNCLOS arts. 27, 28, Malanczuk (1997), p. 178.
58TSC art 23, UNLOSC art. 30.
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The requirement in subparagraph 4 (d) (1) is problematic because although
coastal States have sovereignty over their territorial seas, it is limited by the right
of innocent passage of foreign vessels.59 A coastal State may not hamper the
passage of foreign ships through the State’s territorial sea if not being prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.60 Instead, if the interdiction
of a ship under a flag different from the coastal State takes place in the internal
waters by the coastal State authorities, the act is in accordance with the law of the
sea.61
However, in the territorial sea, the right of innocent passage makes the situation
complicated. Regarding the coastal State’s legislative competences, the 1982 UN
Law of the Sea Convention contains specific provisions relating to innocent pas-
sage. According to Article 21 (1):
[a] a coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this
Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through the
territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal
State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations of the coastal State.
In addition, coastal States must give due publicity to their laws. Moreover, such
laws may not affect the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign
vessels unless they conform to generally accepted international standards.62
Article 21 limits a coastal State’s prior legislative competences and therefore
provides a jurisdictional compromise between coastal State and flag State interests.
Instead, the article grants coastal States certain legislative competences but elim-
inates the risk of divergent design, construction, manning and equipment standards
that might be hard to accommodate when vessels set out on voyage.63 Foreign
vessels have to comply with coastal State laws that are enacted analogously with the
Convention.64 Furthermore, in accordance with Article 21(4), ‘[f]oreign ships
59UNCLOS art. 17.
60Klein (2011), p. 200.
61Wolfrum (2009), p. 90.
62Yearbook of International Law Commission (1956), p. 274, Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 94.
63Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 94, Harrison (2013), p. 170.
64Churchill and Lowe 1999, pp. 94–95. According to Article 22 a coastal State is not allowed to
dismiss recommendations made by the IMO, a competent international organisation, when order-
ing sea lanes. Harrison (2013) argues, however, that the IMO has only a recommendatory role in
this situation (p. 180).
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exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with
all such laws and regulations and all generally accepted international regulations
relating to the prevention of collisions at sea’.65 It is irrelevant whether a flag or
coastal State is party to conventions containing such regulations.66
Article 21 contains an exhaustive list that clearly restricts the matters that a
coastal State may regulate. Thus, a coastal State cannot draw any authorisation
from Article 21 to implement the PSI unless the coastal State is the destination of
the illegal shipment of WMD materials.
5.2 The Right of Innocent Passage
The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention determines that passage is innocent if it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. The Convention
mentioned two activities that were dissociated from the character of innocence. The
passage of foreign fishing vessels was not considered innocent if vessels did not
observe coastal State laws and regulations. Laws and regulations made and
published by coastal States had generally been created with the intention of
preventing vessels from fishing in territorial sea areas. The second exception to
the rule was that submarines had to navigate on the surface and display their
national flag. Otherwise, legal competence was left to the broad jurisdiction of
the coastal States in question when determining whether passage was innocent or
not.67
The situation concerning the concept of innocence changed in 1982 after the UN
Law of the Sea Convention was adopted. UNCLOS includes more specific defini-
tions concerning innocent passage. In Article 19(2), a list of activities that are
considered prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State are
mentioned as follows:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with
other rules of international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of
the coastal State;
65For example, Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
London, 20th October 1972, which entered into force on 15th July 1977, 1050 UNTS 16.
66Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 95.
67TSC art. 14.
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(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
However, the list is not a comprehensive one because the last item forbids any
other activity that is not actually relevant to passage. Nonetheless, any activity that has
no direct bearing on passage will not automatically render passage non-innocent.68
The list focuses on vessels’ activities and therefore suggests that the nature of a
vessel is not sufficient grounds for considering passage non-innocent. In addition,
Article 23 goes further and sets obligations for foreign nuclear-powered vessels and
vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances when
they are exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.69
Consequently, UNCLOS does not prohibit the shipment of WMDs or related
materials.70 Article 23 of the Convention only obliges foreign nuclear-powered
vessels and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious
substances to carry certain documents and to observe special precautionary mea-
sures established for such vessels by international agreements when they are
exercising the right of innocent passage through territorial seas.71 Article 23 clearly
limits the authority of coastal States as they take into account certain issues related
to nuclear-powered vessels and vessels carrying nuclear materials when a decision
must be made in relation to whether passage is deemed to be innocent or not. This
provision indicates that the nature of the vessel or its cargo does not influence the
right of innocent passage as long as it carries with it the appropriate documents and
conforms to precautionary measures established by international law.72 However,
as the So San case73 shows, it is highly probable that a ship involved in the illicit
68Pharand (1977), p. 77, Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 84.
69Art. 23: Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous
or noxious substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea, carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by
international agreements.
70Rayfuse (2005), p. 190. United States required Article 23 to the Convention.
71International agreements, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) and its Annex, as well as IMO recommended codes regarding the construction and
equipment of ships carrying dangerous liquid chemicals or liquefied gases in bulk, Nordquist et al.
(1993), p. 220.
72See International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms Aotearoa New Zealand Branch
http://lcnp.org/disarmament/nwfz/submission%20on%20NWF2.htm.
73The freighter So San was transporting according to ship’s manifest 2000 pounds of concrete,
however, it was also transporting missile parts and an unknown chemical, see Joyner (2005), p. 2.
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trafficking of WMD materials will not carry documents required by Article 23, nor
will it observe precautionary measures. But the coastal State has the right of
non-flag enforcement only if a ship carrying WMDs or related materials engages
such activities that render its passage non-innocent.74 Writers have raised the
question of whether the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related materials through
the territorial seas can be deemed non-innocent.75
Some writers have suggested that the mere passage of a ship carrying illicitly
WMDs is a violation of the right of innocent passage. Lehrman states that although the
list in Article 19(2) does not explicitly refer to trafficking in WMDs or related
materials as prejudicial to the peace, it does not foreclose such an interpretation.76
Kaye argues that ‘Clearly the delivery of WMD to terrorists may well be highly
prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of a coastal State, an argument could
be made that such a passage is therefore not innocent, and the restrictions on coastal
State authority over the passing vessel are removed’.77 Further, Churchill and Lowe
claim that activities seen as posing a threat of force affect third States, as well as
coastal States. Because a coastal State’s security is seen by Churchill and Lowe as
being indirectly linked to a third State’s welfare, they also believe that there is no need
for links to other legal instruments, such as a mutual defence treaty, when aiming to
render threats as incompatible with innocent passage. Thus, paragraph 2 may be
interpreted in such a way as to allow coastal States to act on the impression that a
third State’s security is at stake.78 Further, Joyner holds the view that the wording of
Article 19 (2)(a) is wide enough to include a threat of force against a third State.79
Ronzitti has an opposing view, arguing that a ship entering territorial sea at one
point from the high seas and leaving at another without any intention to enter
internal waters or stop at any port does not violate the right of innocent passage.80
Similarly, Garvey argues that the mere shipment of WMD materials does not
constitute a threat to the coastal State.81 In addition, Logan states that the shipment
of WMD materials does not fit within any of the exceptions listed in Article 19.
Logan believes that it would be difficult, first, to prove that the shipping of WMD
and related materials constituted a threat of force against the coastal State because
95 percent of the materials for WMDs are dual use in nature. Second, it would also
be difficult to prove that the shipping of WMD materials threatened the coastal
State’s sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence and that the
WMD materials were going to be used against that particular State. Third, a
74Rayfuse (2005), p. 190.
75Ronzitti (1990), p. 5, Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 85, Lehrman (2004), p. 232, Garvey (2005),
p. 131, Joyner (2005), p. 529, Logan 2005), p. 259, Kaye (2006), pp. 147–148.
76Lehrman (2004), p. 232.
77Kaye (2006), pp. 147–148.
78Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 85.
79Joyner (2005), p. 529.
80Ronzitti (1990), p. 5.
81Garvey (2005), p. 131.
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violation of the UN Charter requires that the threat or use of force is made in the
territorial sea, and thus a coastal State cannot rely on the future use of the WMDs
because the use is unlikely to take place in the territorial sea.82
The provisions of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention are more detailed than
the simple definitions provided in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. It seems
obvious that the aim of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention was to produce a
more objective definition that would leave coastal States less scope for interpretation,
as well as less potential to abuse their rights when suspending non-innocent passage.
Within the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention text, there are particular references
made to activities. Therefore, a vessel’s presence or passage alone cannot be
interpreted as prejudicial to coastal State interests if the vessel does not engage in
some specific actions. Thus, the formulation of the provision regulating innocent
passage would narrow the scope of the right of innocent passage by adding the illicit
trafficking of WMDs and related materials and their delivery systems to the activities
that are prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
The United States and the former Soviet Union signed the bilateral Treaty on the
Uniform Interpretation of Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage
in 1989.83 Paragraph 3 of this Treaty states the following:
Article 19 of the Convention of 1982 sets out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities
that would render passage innocent. A ship passing through the territorial sea that does not
engage in any of those activities is in innocent passage.
The Uniform Interpretation does not leave an understanding of innocence open
to interpretation. Both States are notable maritime powers,84 and their interpretation
was influential at the time of the agreement. It is noteworthy that these States
referred to the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention. Their common objectives were
obviously to contribute to State practice and to promote their own interpretation in
the future evolution of customary international law. The Uniform Interpretation
was signed on September 1989, at which time the former Soviet Union had signed
the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, but the United States had not. However,
the former Soviet Union had not ratified the 1982 Convention,85 and the Conven-
tion had not entered into force. The Uniform Interpretation made between the two
States is binding upon the two States parties to it but not applicable to third party
States. However, the provisions included in the bilateral treaty may become binding
on third party States if they become norms of customary international law.86 The
82Logan (2005), p. 259.
83LOSB (1989), p. 12.
84Nowadays Russia, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
85The Russian Federation ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on 12th
February 1997. The United States signed the Convention on 29th July 1994 and on 7th October
1994 President Clinton transmitted to the Senate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea. Treaty Document 103–39.
86Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 86. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea entered
into force 16.11.1994.
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restrictive interpretation of the article was created with the best interests of mari-
time powers in mind because it limits the discretion of a coastal State and thus
benefits foreign navies navigating the world’s oceans. Although the United States
and the Soviet Union considered the list a comprehensive one, in fact it included the
phrase ‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’, which left some
scope for further interpretation by coastal States with regard to the nature of
passage.87 At the time they did not see non-State actors as possible users of
WMDs, and therefore there is a strong possibility that the Uniform Interpretation
is not intended to restrict the interpretation of Article 19(2) in the case of the illicit
trafficking of WMDs and related materials and their devices.
Writers’ differing opinions regarding the activity making the passage
non-innocent illustrate that there is a need to discuss the balance of new modes of
threats to coastal States and maritime security caused by non-State actors and the
freedom of navigation for merchant vessels that has been historically linked to
world interests.
However, although the list is considered non-exhaustive, any activity that has no
direct bearing on passage will not automatically render passage non-innocent.
Instead, coastal States have to provide evidence of activities that are deemed
prejudicial to coastal States’ peace, good order or security.88 A coastal State has
to acquire solid intelligence proving that WMDmaterials were being shipped on the
territorial sea.
5.3 The Territorial Waters of the Åland Islands
The essential question to ask in relation to the innocent passage of ships illegally
carrying WMD and related materials through the territorial waters of the Åland
Islands is whether there is sufficient scope available to consider passage
non-innocent on the grounds that passage compromises the principles of
demilitarisation and neutralisation. Governmental transportation, such as naval
warships, is out of the scope of the PSI as it applies only to commercial transpor-
tation. Consequently, any unlawful activities undertaken by warships in the exer-
cise of their official duties will be governed by rules of international law.89 Article
4 (1) of the 1921 Åland Convention says that ‘Except as provided in Article 7, no
military, naval or air force of any Power shall enter or remain in the zone described
in Article 2; the manufacture, import, transport and re-export of arms and imple-
ments of war in this zone are strictly forbidden’. However, the 1921 Åland
Convention particularly mentions warships that have a right of innocent passage
87Hakapa¨a¨ and Molenaar (1999), p. 132.
88Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 84.
89Lehto (2008), s. 57.
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according to regulations established by international law. Thus, the right of inno-
cent passage of warships is firmly embedded in a separate article, Article 5.90 This
indicates that the intention of parties to the Convention could have been to exclude
any evaluation of the innocent passage of warships from being based on concepts of
demilitarisation and neutralisation. With this in mind, then, it seems that Finland is
not authorised to declare passage non-innocent on the ground that warships preju-
dice the peace, good order or security of the Islands because of its demilitarised and
neutralised status.
The right of innocent passage of merchant ships has its origin in the customary
international law and is codified in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and, today,
in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus, although the 1921 Åland
Convention does not mention merchant ships, it is unlikely that the right of innocent
passage of merchant ships as such was meant to be restricted. Furthermore, this grey
area in the Convention’s text means that an interpretation of innocent passage must
be primarily founded on the rules of international law and practice. Regarding the
Finnish national legislation, there are no detailed accounts of what constitutes an act
of non-innocent passage.91 Under the Finnish Territorial Surveillance Act, the
entry, stay and departure of vessels to and from Finnish territorial seas is stated to
be governed by any relevant separate provisions or international treaties binding on
Finland.92 Hence, any evaluation of the nature of passage, whether innocent or not,
rests on the interpretation of UNCLOS.
According to the preamble of the 1921 Åland Convention, it was concluded that
the objective of the Convention was to reduce the islands’ potential as a military
threat. The purpose of the Convention was to protect the coastal States of the Baltic
Sea region and not just Finland. Security was an important motive when States
signed the Åland Convention. The general protection of the region was achieved by
demilitarising and neutralising the land areas and surrounding waters. Thus,
demilitarisation and neutralisation ensured the safety of the region by keeping the
area free from military deployments or operations. When discussing the territorial
waters of the Åland Islands, therefore, one should always bear in mind the interests
of the wider group of countries and not just the principal coastal State involved.
Therefore, in the case that the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related materials will
be used against a party to the 1921Åland Convention, the shipment poses a threat of
force although affecting the third State, the shipment is not in accordance with the
Convention’s aim and purpose. The demilitarised sea area is established to guar-
antee peace and stability in the sense that the Åland Islands shall never become a
90Article 5 says: “The prohibition to send warships into the zone described in Article 2 or to station
them there shall not prejudice the freedom of innocent passage through the territorial waters. Such
passage shall continue to be governed by the international rules and usages in force.”
91Innocent passage is defined in the Finnish Territorial Surveillance Act (755/2000) Section 2 and
includes a specific reference to the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention.
92The Finnish Territorial Surveillance Act, the Finnish Collection of Decrees 178/1938, 755/2000
Section 3.
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threat from a military perspective. However, today, non-State actors, for example
an international terrorist network, can also get in their hands on a nuclear device,
which could constitute a serious and imminent danger to the parties to the 1921
Åland Convention. In this kind of situation, if Finnish authorities had acquired solid
intelligence that proved the illicit trafficking of a nuclear device, even a temporary
presence of illicit trafficking of nuclear devices within the demilitarised and
neutralised zone would become an obvious threat. Therefore, today, this sort of
passage does not seem to conform to the 1921 Åland Convention.
5.4 Article 25 of UNCLOS
According to Article 25 of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, a coastal State
may take necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent.
The article mentions the concept of ‘innocence’, which seems to be the main
criterion. Passage is another prerequisite that a vessel must fulfil before innocence
can be evaluated. The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention also defines the concept
of ‘passage’ but is silent about vessels that do not fulfil the Convention’s require-
ments of passage. Churchill and Lowe claim that the right to exclude passage exists
in customary international law. Vessels hovering around territorial seas could be
deemed non-innocent and may therefore justifiably be excluded from coastal
States’ waters. As passage is directly linked to the concept of innocence, any
violation of passage will automatically be a violation of innocence. The right of
innocent passage applies to vessels as they undertake their voyages through the
territorial sea of a foreign coastal State. If a vessel were to lose the right to innocent
passage, it would then be subject to coastal State jurisdiction, which could possibly
lead to an arrest.93
Innocent passage may be suspended temporarily for two reasons in particular.
Article 25(2) says that
[i]n the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal
waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach
of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call is
subject.
Hakapa¨a¨ and Molenaar have also remarked on this kind of interference, as they
claim that the prevention of innocent passage could take place when a coastal State
suspects a foreign vessel of smuggling alcohol or drugs into its territorial waters.94
Paragraph 2 might imply that the coastal State could stop inbound ships that it
suspected of illicit trafficking of WMD or related materials and their devices.95 The
93Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 87.
94Hakapa¨a¨ and Molenaar (1999), p. 133.
95Logan (2005), p. 261.
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other reason for suspending innocent passage arises when a coastal State believes
that suspension is completely necessary for the protection of itself and its inter-
ests.96 A coastal State has a right to suspend passage through its territorial sea and
may determine whether the passage of a vessel prejudices its security. It is note-
worthy that the right temporarily to suspend innocent passage covers merchant
vessels and warships. Coastal States may exercise this right to exclude foreign
vessels from restricted areas, but the suspension has to be non-discriminatory and
published before becoming effective.
The illicit trafficking of WMDs and related materials and their devices does not
seem to fit within the scope of Article 25(3) because its suspension may not be
discriminatory and the PSI interdiction is aimed at a specific ship or actors of
concern. Furthermore, the PSI interdiction operations have to occur in a specific
area. However, Article 25(1) may establish the legal basis for the PSI interdictions
if the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related materials makes the passage
non-innocent according to Article 19(2).
According to Article 25(1) of UNCLOS, coastal States are allowed to take
necessary steps to prevent non-innocent passage from taking place in their territo-
rial seas. What are, then, ‘the necessary steps’ that a coastal State may take after the
passage is rendered non-innocent? The ship in non-innocent passage is subject to
full coastal State authority, and ‘the coastal State may use any necessary force,
proportionate to the circumstances, to require a delinquent vessel to leave its
territorial sea’.97
5.5 Criminal Jurisdiction in the Territorial Sea
A coastal State has both civil and criminal jurisdiction over merchant vessels
exercising the right of innocent passage, as well as persons on board such vessels.98
However, a coastal State may exercise criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships in its
territorial sea only according to Article 27 of UNCLOS.99 Article 27 of UNCLOS
states the following:
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign
ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation
in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in
the following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the
territorial sea;
96For example, when undertaking weapon exercises on its own or with a third State. See UNCLOS
art. 25 (3).
97Shearer (1986), p. 325.
98TSC arts. 19, 20, UNCLOS arts. 27, 28, Malanczuk (1997), p. 178.
99Rayfuse (2005), p. 190.
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(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship
or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs
or psychotropic substances.
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to take any steps
authorised by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign ship
passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters.
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the coastal State shall, if the master so
requests, notify a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State before taking any
steps and shall facilitate contact between such agent or officer and the ship’s crew. In cases
of emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures are being taken.
4. In considering whether or in what manner an arrest should be made, the local
authorities shall have due regard to the interests of navigation.
5. Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to violations of laws and regulations
adopted in accordance with Part V, the coastal State may not take any steps on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any
investigation in connection with any crime committed before the ship entered the territorial
sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea
without entering internal waters.
Paragraph 1 uses the phrase ‘should not be exercised’, while paragraph 5 uses the
phrase ‘may not take any steps’. The different wording illustrates the different
juridical nature of the zones in which the suspected criminal offence took place. In
the situation envisaged in Article 27(1), the suspected crime has happened on board
a ship during its passage through the territorial sea, and thus the coastal State is
entitled to exercise jurisdiction. However, the provision limits the coastal State’s
authority to four particular cases. It is clear that the interests of the freedom of
international trade and navigation are protected unless there are significant causes
to supersede them by the demands of criminal justice.100
In the situation referred in paragraph 2, it is necessary for the coastal State to have
criminalised the illicit passage of WMD and related materials in its domestic legisla-
tion in order to allow the coastal State’s authorities to interdict or detain ships that are
passing through the territorial sea after leaving the internal waters of the coastal State.
Paragraph 5 of Article 27 regulates the situation in which the suspected crime
has taken place beyond the territorial sea of the coastal State when a vessel is
beyond the reach of the coastal State’s criminal law. The wording of paragraph
5 does not seem to give discretion to a coastal State because the phrase ‘may not’
indicates a clear prohibition regarding the exercise of the coastal State’s criminal
jurisdiction.101
Klein argues that the coastal State’s domestic legislation that criminalises the
illicit passage of WMDs and related materials would overcome this particular
restriction. Thus, the prevention of the proliferation of WMDs and related materials
to non-State actors is in the hands of States, depending on their will to use the
available legal tools.102 In addition, Logan holds the view that the protective
100Brown (1994), p. 64.
101O’Connell (1984), p. 962, Brown (1994), p. 64.
102Article 27(2), (3), Klein (2011), pp. 201–202.
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principle according to which a State has a right to protect itself against threatening
acts done outside its territory and Article 27 are legal tools to justify the PSI in the
territorial sea. Logan comes to this conclusion based on an analogous interpretation
of Article 27(1) (d) relating to the illicit trafficking of drugs.103 However, although
the coastal State has criminalised the illicit passage of WMDs and related materials
it would also need to associate this kind of activity with the activities regarded
to disturbing the peace of the coastal State or good order of its territorial sea or
consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State.104
Wolfrum considers that the above-mentioned interpretation of Article 27 is
problematic. Application of Article 27 requires that the crime has been committed
on board the ship passing through the territorial sea and the crime disturbs the peace
of the coastal State or good order of its territorial sea. This kind of interpretation of
Article 27 would also make it possible to prohibit the transport of nuclear waste, as
well as the transport of dangerous substances.105 This extensive interpretation of
Article 27 would be problematic because it would be inconsistent with Article 23.
Therefore, the mere passage of a foreign ship through the territorial sea carrying
illicitly WMDs or related materials does not meet the requirements for the exercise
of the criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State.
Finland is party to the most significant WMD treaties and political arrangements,
as well as the SUA Conventions and the 2005 SUA Protocols. Finland has
implemented them in its domestic legislation and criminalised the illicit trafficking
of WMD and related materials.
In Finland, the responsibility for criminal investigation rests with the police,
Customs, the Border Guard and the Defence Forces. The management and organi-
sation of the Finnish Border Guard is within the Ministry of the Interior, from which
it follows that the Border Guard’s vessels and aircraft are not treated as warships.
The demilitarisation regime is regulated directly by a multilevel legal framework,
and Finland’s sovereign rights as a coastal State are significantly restricted by the
1921 Åland Convention. These restrictions focus on the military presence in
the zone.
The responsibility to conduct a criminal investigation in offences made with
terrorist intent rests with the police, and they have a right to receive executive
assistance, which includes also the use of military force, in the territorial waters and
EEZ of Finland from the Border Guard and the Defence Forces.106 The police have
the main responsibility because the use of force against the illicit trafficking of
WMDs and related materials is not the use of force against the enemy according to
103Logan (2005), p. 263, Klein (2011), p. 202.
104Klein (2011), p. 76.
105Wolfrum (2009), p. 91, Hakapa¨a¨ (1981), p. 198 refers e.g. murder on board as ”other” other
activities on board the vessel “which may have “external” effects”.
106Border Guard Act the Finnish Collection of Decrees 178/1938 578/2005 Section 77a, 79, Laki
puolustusvoimien virka-avusta poliisille the Finnish Collection of Decrees 178/1938.
781/1980 Section 1.
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the law of armed conflict, as there is no armed conflict, international or national.107
The police will decide case by case whether the executive assistance is requested
from the Border Guard or the Defence Forces.108
The Finnish Defence Forces do not have any police powers. Regarding the area
of the Åland Islands, the Finnish navy thus has no authority to board a suspected
ship, to inspect the ship, to arrest the crew or to take control of any kind over the
crew in the maritime zones of Finland. According to the Act on the Defence Forces
Section 2 (2)(a), Defence Forces provide ‘support for other authorities, including
the following:
a) executive assistance to maintain public order and security, to prevent and
interrupt terrorist acts, and otherwise to protect society at large’.
According to Section 79 of the Border Guard Act (578/2005), the Border Guard
has the right to receive executive assistance from the Defence Forces, among other
protective equipment necessary for the safe performance of a dangerous Border
Guard function and equipment and the special expertise necessary to combat a
security threat to a ship at sea or to passengers on board. However, the assistance
does not include the use of firearms or military force.
However, the police have to take into account the international treaty arrange-
ments related to the demilitarisation of the Åland Islands. These treaty arrange-
ments oblige Finland to guarantee the security of the demilitarised Åland Islands.
There are three different opinions concerning the interpretation of Article 4 of the
1921 Åland Convention and the presence of Defence Forces in the demilitarised
zone in the case of executive assistance.109 First, the executive assistance of the
Defence Forces for the operation requested by the police is under the command of
the civil authority, and therefore the troop of the Defence Forces is regarded as
civilian, and thus its presence is not regulated by the 1921 Åland Convention.
Second, the troop of the Defence Forces is regarded as military, but the 1921 Åland
Convention offers certain exceptions when considering a military presence within
the zone during peacetime. Thus, the executive assistance of the Defence Forces is
based on Article 4 (2)(a) of the 1921 Åland Convention, which says:
(a) In addition to the regular police force necessary to maintain public order and security in
the zone, in conformity with the general provisions in force in the Finnish Republic,
Finland may, if exceptional circumstances demand, send into the zone and keep there
temporarily such other armed forces as shall be strictly necessary for the maintenance of
order.
107Treves (2009), p. 412.
108Government Proposal HE 220/2013 vp., Laki puolustusvoimien virka-avusta poliisille the
Finnish Collection of Decrees 178/1938.
781/1980.
109Ministry of Defence (2014), p. 7.
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Thereby, the military presence does not in this kind of exceptional situation
violate the limitations set on Finnish naval visits by the 1921 Åland Convention.
The responsibility for the provision of executive assistance in the area of the Åland
Islands regarding the Defence Forces rests mainly with the Finnish navy. The third
interpretation considers the restrictions of the 1921 Åland Convention as covering
the troop of the Defence Forces as well in the case of executive assistance requests
by the police.110 Thus, military presence would not be allowed in the zone, even in
exceptional situations. The last interpretation would mean that the police and the
Border Guard could not ask for executive assistance from the Finnish navy, even
when the activity that renders passage non-innocent occurs in the demilitarised
zone. Regarding the illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials, the second
option seems plausible in the context of the coastal State authority to enforce
protective rules.
6 Concluding Observations
Boarding a foreign ship without permission or other authorisation is in contraven-
tion of international law. This kind of activity on the territorial waters of the Åland
Islands by the Finnish military authorities, when directed at governmental ships or
civilian ships believed to be carrying WMD or related materials, could be
interpreted to be against the provisions of the treaty arrangements that demilitarise
the sea area around the Åland Islands.
Participants of the PSI are committed to taking appropriate actions to stop and/or
search, in their internal waters, territorial seas or contiguous zones, vessels that are
reasonably suspected of carrying cargoes of WMDs, their delivery systems or
related materials to or from States or non-State actors of proliferation concern
and to seize such cargoes that are identified. The State always has a right to take
interdiction operations against its own vessels. However, in the demilitarised zone
of the Åland Islands, this might be problematic, even against ships flying the
Finnish flag.
The 3-nautical-mile demilitarised sea area around the Åland Islands belongs to
Finland’s internal waters and territorial sea. Thus, Finland’s authority to regulate
innocent passage through the Åland Islands’ territorial sea depends on the current
legal framework. In the territorial sea, the enforcement of the requirements of the
PSI rests on the interpretation of Article 19 (2) of UNCLOS. In spite of claims for
an independent nature of the right of innocent passage, coastal States have the
authority to prevent passage that is not innocent and to adopt new laws and
regulations relating to passage. Taking into consideration the objective and purpose
of demilitarisation and neutralisation, the Åland Islands’ surrounding sea areas
110Ministry of Defence (2014), p. 7.
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might differ from other sea areas when it comes to the nature of peace, good order
or security. When discussing the territorial waters of the Åland Islands, therefore,
one should always bear in mind the interests of the wider group of countries and not
just Finland. In a case concerning the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related
materials through the demilitarised territorial sea area where there is solid intelli-
gence that the intentions are threatening a party to the 1921 Åland Convention, the
shipment would pose a threat of force that is not in accordance with the Conven-
tion’s aim and purpose. When the passage through the territorial waters of the
Åland Islands is rendered non-innocent, any enforcement measures undertaken
must meet the provisions of the 1921 Åland Convention.
References
Actes de la Confe´rence. relative a la non-fortification et a la neutralisation des ıˆles d’Aland, tenue a
Gene`ve, du 10 au 20 octobre 1921. (1922). Publie par les soins du Secretariat Permanent de la
Socie´te´ des Nations. Gene`ve
Ahlstr€om C (2005) The proliferation security initiative: international law aspects of the statement
of interdiction principles. In: SIPRI Yearbook 2005: armaments, disarmament and interna-
tional security, pp 741–765
Allen CH (2007) Matitime counterproliferation operations and the rule of law. Praeger Security
International
Beck ME (2004) The promise and limits of the PSI. The Monitor 10(1):16–17. Available via,
Center for International Trade and Security. http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/monitor/
monitor_sp_2004.pdf. Accessed 3 Feb 2016
Bergin A (2005) The proliferation security initiative-implications for the Indian Ocean. Int J Mar
Coast Law 20(1):85–95
Brown ED (1994) The international law of the sea, volume introductory manual
Byers M (2004) Policing the high seas: the proliferation security initiative. Am J Int Law 98
(3):526–545
Churchill RR, Lowe AV (1999) The law of the sea. Manchester University Press
Cirincione J, Williams J (2005) Putting PSI into Perspective, April 27 2005. In: Carnegie
endowment for international peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/2005/04/27/putting-psi-
into-perspective. Accessed 18 Feb 2016
Dixon DB (2006) Transnational shipments of nuclear materials by sea: do current safeguards
provide coastal states a right to deny innocent passage? The Berkeley Electronic Press Paper
1794, pp 1–34. http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1794. Accessed 9 Feb 2016
Durkalec J (2012) The proliferation security initiative: evolution and future prospects. EU
Non-Proliferation Consortium Non-Proliferation Papers, pp 1–21
Fact Sheet The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2003 September 4. http://www.state.
gov/t/isn/c27726.htm. Accessed 16 Feb 2016
FidlerDP (2003)Weapons ofmass destruction and international law.ASIL Insights 8(3). https://www.
asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/3/weapons-mass-destruction-and-international-law. Accessed
25 July 2016
Garvey JI (2005) The international institutional imperative for countering the spread of weapons of
mass destruction: assessing the proliferation security initiative. J Conflict Secur Law 10
(2):125–147
Government Proposal. HE 220/2013 vp. Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi rajavartiolain
muuttamisesta seka¨ era¨iksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi
The Right of Innocent Passage: The Challenge of the Proliferation Security. . . 267
Hakapa¨a¨ K (1981) Marine pollution in international law, material obligations and jurisdiction with
special reference to the Third United Nations Conference on the law of the sea. Suomalainen
Tiedeakatemia, Helsinki
Hakapa¨a¨ K (1988) Uusi kansainva¨linen merioikeus. Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, Helsinki
Hakapa¨a¨ K, Molenaar EJ (1999) Innocent passage - past and present. Mar Policy 23(2):131–145
Hannikainen L (1994) The continued validity of the demilitarised and neutralised status of the
Åland Islands. Zeitschrift für ausla¨ndisches €offentliches Recht und V€olkerrecht 54:614–651
Harrison J (2013) Making the law of the sea, a study in the development of international.
Cambridge University Press
HELCOM (2014) Annual report on shipping accidents in the Baltic Sea in 2013. HELCOM-Baltic
Marine Environment Protection Commission
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms Aotearoa New Zealand Branch (n.d.)
Submission to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on the
New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Extension Bill. http://lcnp.org/disarmament/nwfz/submis
sion%20on%20NWF2.htm. Accessed 21 March 2016
Jimenez Kwast P (2007) Maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction in an international
perspective. Neth Yearb Int Law 38:163–241
Jinyuan S (2012) The proliferation security initiative (PSI) and interdiction at sea: a Chinese
perspective. Ocean Dev Int Law 43(1):96–118. doi:10.1080/00908320.2012.647515
Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Uniform Interpretation of Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage (1989).
Law of the Sea Bulletin 1989(14):12–13
Joyner DH (2005) The proliferation security initiative: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
international law. Yale J Int Law 30:507–548
Kaye S (2006) The proliferation security initiative in the maritime domain. Int Law Stud
81:141–164
Klein N (2011) Maritime security and the law of the sea. Oxford University Press
Kraska J (2009) Grasping “The Influence of Law on Sea Power”. Naval War Coll Rev 62
(3):113–135
Lehrman TD (2004) Enhancing the proliferation security initiative: the case for a decentralized
nonproliferation architecture. Virginia J Int Law 45:223–276
Lehto M (2008) International responsibility for terrorists acts. A shift towards more indirect forms
of responsibility. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 139, Lapland University Press, Vaajakoski
Logan SE (2005) The proliferation security initiative: navigating the legal challenges. J Transl
Law Policy 14(2):253–274
Malanczuk P (1997) Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. Seventh revised
edition. Routledge, London
McDougal MS, Burke WT (1987) The public order of the oceans. A contemporary international
law of the sea. New Haven Press, New Haven
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. http://formin.fi/public/default.aspx?
contentid¼325890&contentlan¼2&culture¼en-US. Accessed 16 Feb 2016
Ministry of Defence, Selvitys/Utredning HARE PLM001:00/2014, FI.PLM.2015-2073,
767/00.99.00/2014
Nordquist MH, Nandan SN, Rosenna S, Grandy NR (eds) (1993) United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Volume II. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
O’Brien P (2012) The Åland Islands Solution. A precedent for successful international disputes
settlement. http://legal.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/POB%20Aalands%20Islands%20Exhi
bition%20opening.pdf. Accessed 26 Aug 2014
O’Connell DP (1984) In: Shearer IA (ed) The International Law of the Sea Volume II. Clarendon
Press, Oxford
Pharand D (1977) International straits. Thesaurus Acroasium 7:64–100
Proliferation Security Initiative. http://www.psi-online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/01-about-psi/0-
about-us.html. Accessed 5 Feb 2016
268 P. Kleemola-Juntunen
Prosser A, Scoville HJ (2004) The proliferation security initiative in perspective. Center for
Defense Information June 16, 2004. http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf. Accessed 3 Feb 2016
Rayfuse R (2005) Regulation and enforcement in the law of the sea: emerging assertions of a right
to non-flag state enforcement in the high seas fisheries and disarmament contexts. Aust Yearb
Int Law 24:181–200
Remarks by the President to the People of Poland 2003 May. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html. Accessed 16 Feb 2016
Ronzitti N (1990) The law of the sea and the use of force against terrorists activities. In: Ronzitti N
(ed) Maritime terrorism and international law. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp 1–14
Shearer IA (1986) Problems of jurisdiction and law enforcement against delinquent vessels. Int
Comp Law Q 35(2):320–343
Thomas TV (2009) The proliferation security initiative: towards relegation of navigational
freedoms in UNCLOS? An Indian perspective. Chin J Int Law 8(3):657–680
Tornberg R (2009) Folkra¨ttsliga aspekter pa˚ Proliferation Security Initiative. Inra¨desanf€orande
ha˚llet vid Kungl. O¨rlogsmannasa¨llskapets ordinarie sammantra¨de i Stockholm, pp 137–149
Treves T (2009) Piracy, law of the sea, and use of force: developments off Coast of Somalia. Eur J
Int Law 20(2):399–414
US Department of State (2003) Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman’s Statement at the Third
Meeting. Third Meeting of the PSI, September 3–4, 2003. http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/
other/25425.htm. Accessed 16 Feb 2016
US Department of State Proliferation Security Initiative. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.
Accessed 16 Feb 2016
Vukas B (2004). The law of the sea: selected writings. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
Winner AC (2005) The proliferation security initiative: the new face of interdiction. Wash Q 28
(2):129–143
Wolfrum R (2009) Freedom of navigation: new challenges. In: Norquist MH, Koh TT, Moore NJ
(eds) Freedom of seas, passage rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Matinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, pp 79–94
Yearbook of International Law Commission Volume II (1956)
Case
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I. C.
J. Reports 1996, p 66
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/),
which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
The Right of Innocent Passage: The Challenge of the Proliferation Security. . . 269
